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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Liberty and equality have always had a complex interrelationship. Liberty 
protects individual choice, while equality protects individuals from discrimination 
based on statuses about which they have no choice. Examining liberty and equality 
in the context of parent-child relationships adds an additional layer of complexity. 
When a woman exercises her liberty to procreate by using her deceased husband’s 
genetic material, her children may experience inequality due to their status as 
posthumously conceived.1 Such children are, in some states, denied Social Security 
survivors benefits because their deceased genetic parent is not viewed as their legal 
parent.2 This was the case with Karen Capato’s twins, who were conceived using her 
deceased husband’s sperm and subsequently denied the survivors benefits that their 
                                                 
 Professor of Law, University of Toledo College of Law. I would like to thank Professors 
Susan Martyn, Rebecca Zietlow, Kelly Moore, Kara Bruce, and Shelley Cavalieri for their 
helpful comments during the drafting of this essay. I would also, as always, like to thank Mike 
Loegering for his encouragement, wisdom, and love. 
 1 These are, of course, not the only liberty and equality considerations that exist within 
the context of parent-child relationships. I have illustrated elsewhere that the two rights 
always have multiple dimensions, such that parents have equality interests and children have 
liberty interests. Jessica Knouse, Reconciling Liberty and Equality in the Debate over 
Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis, 2013 UTAH L. REV. (forthcoming 2013). This essay, 
however, focuses on the liberty interests of parents and the equality interests of children as 
they operate within the context of posthumous conception. 
 2 Astrue v. Capato, 132 S. Ct. 2021 (2012).  
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older (non-posthumously conceived) brother was able to receive because their 
genetic father was not viewed as their legal parent.3 When Karen Capato’s case 
reached the Supreme Court in 2012, her equal protection arguments were rejected 
and survivors benefits were withheld on the basis that the twins were not Robert 
Capato’s “children.”4 
This essay uses Astrue v. Capato as a platform to examine how liberty and 
equality interact within parent-child relationships. It observes that as prospective 
parents have experienced an increase in liberty due to new reproductive technologies 
the children they create have not necessarily experienced a commensurate increase in 
equality. The law’s myopic focus on parent-child relationships rather than provider-
dependent relationships renders posthumously conceived children unequal along 
multiple dimensions. They may have not only one provider, but also only one 
parent.5 This essay argues that shifting the law’s focus away from identifying parents 
and towards identifying providers would mitigate the status inequality that 
posthumously conceived children currently experience without (necessarily) altering 
the allocation of benefits. The Capato case would have had a very different legacy if, 
instead of determining whether the twins were Robert Capato’s “children,”6 the 
Social Security Administration had simply determined whether they were his 
“dependents.” This proposal fits with recent challenges to traditional notions of 
parentage.7 
Part II provides background information. It describes the current law with respect 
to the parentage of posthumously conceived children and offers a detailed account of 
Astrue v. Capato.8 Part III considers the liberty and equality implications of 
posthumous conception. It addresses the doctrinal as well as practical aspects of 
liberty and equality and observes that, while prospective parents have substantial 
liberty to elect posthumous conception, the children they create may experience 
inequality associated with their status as posthumously conceived—in part, because 
they may have only one legal parent. Part IV suggests a diminution in the law’s 
focus on parentage. It argues that the law should focus less on parent-child 
relationships and more on provider-dependent relationships by, for example, 
eliminating the use of parental status as a proxy for provider status under the Social 
Security Act. Part V concludes that this shift in focus from parental status to 
provider status would protect the liberty of adults, promote the equality of children, 
and perhaps achieve a more just distribution of governmental benefits. 
                                                 
 3 Id. at 2023, 2034.  
 4 Id. at 2033–34. 
 5 As Part III(B) will discuss, posthumously conceived children are also a subset of non-
marital children. Marital status discrimination is, however—for purposes of this essay—only a 
secondary consideration. See infra Part III(B). This is, in part, because I have argued 
elsewhere that civil marriage should be abolished. Jessica Knouse, Civil Marriage: Threat to 
Democracy, 18 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 361 (2012). Rather than reiterating my previous 
arguments, I will simply note that abolishing civil marriage would be my preferred means of 
creating equality between marital and non-marital children. 
 6 Capato, 132 S. Ct. at 2027–34.  
 7 See, e.g., Susan Frelich Appleton, Parents by the Numbers, 37 HOFSTRA L. REV. 11, 12 
(2008). 
 8 Capato, 132 S. Ct. at 2021. 
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II.  UNDERSTANDING POSTHUMOUS CONCEPTION 
Part II describes the current law with respect to the parentage of posthumously 
conceived children. It focuses on whether a deceased gamete-provider can be viewed 
as a legal parent. Part II(a) offers a brief overview of existing state statutes, and Part 
II(b) provides a detailed account of Astrue v. Capato. 
A.  Posthumous Conception and Legal Parentage 
Posthumous conception can occur through at least two mechanisms. It can be 
accomplished using genetic material—a sperm, an egg, or an embryo—that was 
cryopreserved during an individual’s lifetime to allow for the possibility of future 
parenthood,9 or it can be accomplished using genetic material that was harvested 
after an individual’s death at the request of a survivor.10 The former mechanism is 
the more common at present,11 and one can imagine a variety of reasons that a living 
individual might elect to cryopreserve his or her genetic material, including concerns 
about infertility resulting from medical treatment (e.g., chemotherapy), exposure to 
toxins or other dangers (e.g., in the course of combat), or normal aging processes.12 
One of the primary legal issues arising from posthumous conception is parentage, 
yet at present less than one-third of the states have statutes addressing whether 
deceased gamete-providers should be viewed as the parents of posthumously 
conceived children.13 Many of the states that do have statutes have embraced policies 
similar to Section 707 of the Uniform Parentage Act,14 which provides: 
If an individual who consented in a record to be a parent by assisted 
reproduction dies before placement of eggs, sperm, or embryos, the 
deceased individual is not a parent of the resulting child unless the 
deceased spouse consented in a record that if assisted reproduction were 
to occur after death, the deceased individual would be a parent of the 
child.15 
                                                 
 9 Katheryn Katz, Parenthood from the Grave. 2006 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 289, 292 (2006). As 
Professor Judith Daar has written, “Birth after death can be accomplished by freezing sperm, 
eggs, or embryos when they are viable, maintaining them in a frozen state in a manner that 
preserves their structure and function, and thawing the material so as to restore their capacity 
to become a new human being.” JUDITH DAAR, REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES AND THE LAW 
522 (2d ed. 2013). 
 10 Katz, supra note 9 (“[I]t is possible to retrieve gametes from individuals who are 
deceased, brain dead, comatose, or in a persistent vegetative state (“PVS”) for use in 
procreation by the recipient.”). Professor Judith Daar writes, “[m]ore than a handful of births 
have been reported using sperm retrieved from a man who has been declared dead, and while 
there are no verified reports of postmortem egg retrieval and birth, no technophile can doubt 
this possibility is on the horizon.” DAAR, supra note 9. 
 11 DAAR, supra note 9 (“Currently the vast majority of gametes are retrieved while the 
progenitor is still alive . . .”). 
 12 Browne Lewis, Graveside Birthday Parties: The Legal Consequences of Forming 
Families Posthumously, 60 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1159, 1170, 1173–74 (2010). 
 13 DAAR, supra note 9. Another legal issue that often arises is inheritance rights. Lewis, 
supra note 12, at 1179–81. 
 14 DAAR, supra note 9, at 562. 
15 Unif. Parentage Act § 707 (2000) (amended 2002). 
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Under such statutes, whether a deceased gamete-provider will be viewed as a parent 
depends upon whether he or she specifically consented to be the parent of a child 
who was conceived and born after his or her death. 
Some state statutes, rather than speaking directly to parentage, speak to 
inheritance rights—i.e., to whether a child can inherit from a gamete-provider whose 
death preceded his or her conception. In Florida, for example, where the Capato case 
occurred, a posthumously conceived child is statutorily barred from inheriting from a 
deceased gamete-provider unless he or she was expressly provided for by will.16 
Florida’s intestacy statute provides, in relevant part, “[a] child conceived from the . . 
. sperm of a person . . . who died before the transfer of their . . . sperm . . . to a 
woman’s body shall not be eligible for a claim against the decedent’s estate unless 
the child has been provided for by the decedent’s will.”17 While this language does 
not speak directly to parentage, it influences parentage when read in conjunction 
with the Social Security Act. As Part II(b) will explain, since the Social Security 
Administration looks to state intestacy law to determine whether an applicant for 
survivors benefits is the “child” of a deceased insured wage earner, state intestacy 
statutes effectively determine parentage. The fact that so few states have statutes 
addressing the parentage of posthumously conceived children has left governmental 
entities with little guidance. This essay, acknowledging the lack of legislative 
guidance, asks whether and to what extent governmental entities ought to be using 
parent-child relationships as proxies for provider-dependent relationships. 
B.  Astrue v. Capato 
This subsection describes the facts and analysis of Astrue v. Capato in order to 
illustrate how an adult’s exercise of procreative liberty—i.e., the decision to engage 
in posthumous conception—could cause the resulting children to experience 
inequality. Karen Capato’s posthumously conceived twins experienced inequality, in 
part, because they had only one legal parent, while their non-posthumously 
conceived genetic sibling had two legal parents.18 It should be noted at the outset that 
this subsection merely describes the Court’s reasoning, while Part III(b) provides a 
more in-depth analysis of the equal protection issues raised by posthumous 
conception. 
Shortly after Karen and Robert Capato were married, Robert was diagnosed with 
esophageal cancer.19 Because he was advised that the treatment (chemotherapy) 
might render him sterile, Robert had some of his sperm frozen and banked.20 The 
Capatos, however, conceived naturally and had a son whom they hoped would one 
                                                 
 16 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.17(4) (West 2013) (“A child conceived from the eggs or sperm 
of a person or persons who died before the transfer of their eggs, sperm, or preembryos to a 
woman's body shall not be eligible for a claim against the decedent's estate unless the child 
has been provided for by the decedent's will.”). 
 17 Id. 
 18 Although the Social Security Act focuses on whether someone is a deceased insured 
wage earner’s “child” rather than whether the deceased insured wage earner is a “parent,” the 
inquiry is substantially the same since one generally cannot be the “child” of someone without 
that person being their “parent.” Astrue v. Capato, 132 S. Ct. 2021, 2027 (2012).  
 19 Id. at 2026. 
 20 Id. 
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day have a sibling.21 Robert’s will provided for his and Karen’s son as well as for 
two children from a prior marriage.22 Although Robert and Karen told their attorney 
that they wanted any future children to be treated the same as any existing children, 
Robert’s will did not make any provision for future children.23 When Robert’s and 
Karen’s son was about seven months old, Robert passed away.24 Robert’s banked 
sperm, however, remained viable and was used by Karen to conceive twins who 
were born eighteen months after Robert’s death.25 
When Karen applied for Social Security survivor’s benefits for the twins the 
Social Security Administration (“SSA”) denied her application on the basis that the 
twins were not Robert’s “children.”26 The Social Security Act, which generally 
speaking is designed to provide “dependent members of [a wage earner’s] family 
with protection against . . . the loss of [the insured’s] earnings,”27 defines the term 
“child” in two relevant sections.28 Section 416(e), which provided the basis for 
Karen’s argument, states, “‘[C]hild means (1) the child or legally adopted child of an 
individual[.]”29 Section 416(h)(2)(A), which provided the basis for the SSA’s 
argument, states, “In determining whether an applicant is the child . . . of [an] 
insured wage earner[,] the Commissioner of Social Security shall apply [the 
intestacy law of the insured individual’s domiciliary State].”30 Robert had been 
domiciled in the State of Florida, which, as discussed in Part II(a), does not allow 
posthumously conceived children to take through intestacy.31 
The district court accepted the SSA’s argument, but the Third Circuit accepted 
Karen’s argument and reversed, observing that the twins were “‘the undisputed 
biological children of a deceased wage earner and his widow.’”32 The Supreme Court 
granted certiorari, likely because the four courts of appeal that had spoken were 
                                                 
 21 Id. 
 22 Id. 
 23 Id. 
 24 Id. 
 25 Id. 
 26 Id. 
 27 Id. at 2032 (“The aim was not to create a program ‘generally benefiting needy persons’; 
it was, more particularly, to ‘provide . . . dependent members of [a wage earner’s] family with 
protection against the hardship occasioned by [the] loss of [the insured's] earnings.’”) (quoting 
Califano v. Jobst, 434 U.S. 47, 52 (1977)). 
 28 Id. at 2027–28; 42 U.S.C. § 416(e), (h)(2)(A) (2004). 
 29 Capato, 132 S. Ct. at 2027; 42 U.S.C. § 416(e) (2004). 
 30 Capato, 132 S. Ct. at 2028; 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(2)(A) (2004). While other sub-sections 
within §416(h) provide alternative definitions, they were not invoked in this litigation. 
Capato, 132 S. Ct. at 2028, n.5. 
 31 Capato, 132 S. Ct. at 2026. Florida’s intestacy statute is discussed in greater detail 
above in Part II(A). See infra Part II(A). 
 32 Capato, 132 S. Ct. at 2027 (citing Capato v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 31 F. 3d 626, 631 
(2011)). 
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evenly split in their interpretations of the Social Security Act.33 The Third and Ninth 
Circuits, applying §416(e), had both granted benefits because the children’s 
biological parentage was undisputed, whereas the Fourth and Eighth Circuits, 
applying §416(h)(2)(A), had both denied benefits because the children could not take 
under state intestacy law.34 The Supreme Court, in a unanimous opinion authored by 
Justice Ginsburg, agreed with the Fourth and Eighth Circuits that §416(h)(2)(A) 
controlled, and held that, because the twins were not Robert’s “children” under 
Florida’s intestacy law, the SSA had properly denied them survivors benefits.35 
Although Karen raised an equal protection argument, claiming that using 
§416(h)(2)(A) in such a manner unlawfully discriminated against posthumously 
conceived children—not least, in the sense that Karen’s non-posthumously 
conceived son was able to receive survivors benefits while her posthumously 
conceived twins were not36—the Supreme Court rejected her argument without much 
discussion.37 The Court acknowledged that laws targeting non-marital children have 
traditionally received intermediate scrutiny, in part, because of the unfairness of 
punishing children for the acts of their parents.38 But it found there had been no 
showing that laws targeting posthumously conceived children merit similarly 
heightened scrutiny.39 It thus applied rational basis review and upheld the use of 
§416(h)(2)(A), even in cases where biological parentage is undisputed.40 The Court 
held that looking to state intestacy law to determine parentage was rationally related 
to two legitimate governmental interests: first, conserving benefits for children who 
have actually lost a parent’s support, and second, avoiding the need for 
individualized inquiries into dependency.41 As previously mentioned, the equal 
protection issues raised by posthumous conception will be discussed further in Part 
III(B). 
III.  IMPLICATIONS OF POSTHUMOUS CONCEPTION 
Part III illustrates that as prospective parents have experienced an increase in 
liberty due to new reproductive technologies their children have not necessarily 
experienced a commensurate increase in equality. Karen Capato’s exercise of 
liberty—i.e., her decision to use her late husband’s sperm to conceive—impacted her 
children’s equality under existing legal parentage regimes. There was even 
inequality among Karen’s own three children. The oldest, born before his father’s 
death, had two legal parents and was thus entitled to survivors benefits; while the 
                                                 
 33 Id. at 2007. 
 34 Id. (citing Capato v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 626, 631 (2011); Gillett-Netting v. 
Barnhart, 371 F.3d 593, 596–97 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004); Beeler v. Astrue, 651 F.3d 954, 960–64 
(Cal. Ct. App. 2011); Schafer v. Astrue, 641 F.3d 49, 54–63 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011)). 
 35 See generally Capato, 132 S. Ct. at 2021. 
 36 Id. at 2021, 2032–33.  
 37 Id. at 2033. 
 38 Id. (citing Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988)). 
 39 Id. at 2033.   
 40 Id. 
 41 Id. 
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twins, conceived and born after their father’s death, had only one legal parent (their 
mother) and were therefore denied survivors benefits.42 Part III(a) addresses the 
liberty of adults who wish to engage in posthumous conception, and Part III(b) 
addresses the equality of children born through posthumous conception. 
A.  Liberty Rights of Prospective Posthumous Conceivers 
Liberty has both doctrinal and practical definitions, and this section begins by 
focusing on its doctrinal definitions. To that end, it provides a brief overview of 
Supreme Court cases involving the right to procreate and considers whether that 
right extends to procreation by means of posthumous conception. Assuming that the 
right could extend to procreation by means of posthumous conception, this section 
then considers who might be able to invoke the right—e.g., a surviving prospective 
parent or deceased gamete-provider (through his or her legal representative). This 
section concludes with a brief discussion of liberty’s more practical definitions and 
observes that—whatever its formal doctrinal dimensions—the paucity of legal 
regulations surrounding reproductive technologies has conferred substantial practical 
liberty on those who wish to engage in posthumous conception. 
The Due Process Clauses of the 5th and 14th Amendments have historically 
protected the liberty to make decisions about procreation.43 While the Supreme Court 
has never in the context of a due process decision directly recognized the right to 
procreate, it has on numerous occasions recognized the right not to procreate—often 
framing it as a right to decide “whether to bear or beget a child.”44 Furthermore, in a 
1942 opinion focusing on equal protection the Court described procreation as 
“fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race” and as a “basic civil 
right.”45 While recent cases have called into question whether procreative liberty 
remains a “fundamental” liberty,46 this essay proceeds from the premise that it 
continues to exist in at least some limited form.47 
Assuming that procreative liberty continues to exist, it is not at all clear whether 
it extends to encompass non-coital—much less posthumous—conception. 
Historically, the test of whether a given liberty was “fundamental” and thus triggered 
“strict scrutiny” involved framing the liberty “careful[ly],”48 and asking whether it 
                                                 
 42 Capato ex rel. B.N.C. v. Comm'r Soc. Sec., No. 10-2027, 2013 WL 3814947 *1 (3d Cir. 
July 24, 2013).  
 43 U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV (preventing the government from depriving “any person 
of . . . liberty . . . without due process of law”); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972); 
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 179, 212–13 (1973); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 
833, 851 (1992). 
 44 Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453; Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 170; Casey, 505 U.S. at 851. 
 45 Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942). 
 46 Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007). 
 47 As recently as 2003, the Supreme Court referred to the existence of a right to decide 
“whether to bear or beget a child.” Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 565 (2003). Gonzales v. 
Carhart, in 2007, did not directly repudiate this statement, though it (as mentioned) did call it 
into question. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124. 
 48 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997) (“[W]e have required in 
substantive-due-process cases a ‘careful description’ of the asserted fundamental liberty 
interest.”). By “carefully,” the Court appears to mean “narrowly.” 
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was “deeply rooted in our nation’s history and tradition” and “‘implicit in the 
concept of ordered liberty,’ such that ‘neither liberty nor justice would exist if [it 
was] sacrificed.’”49 Under such a test, posthumous conception would most likely not 
be viewed as a “fundamental” liberty, since it was not technologically possible for 
most of our nation’s history. In a 2003 case, however, rather than asking whether the 
liberty at issue was consistent with existing traditions, the Court observed that it was 
consistent with “emerging” traditions and proceeded to apply what might be 
described as “a more searching form of rational basis review.”50 Under such a 
standard, laws burdening posthumous conception could potentially receive 
something more than regular rational basis review. 
Regardless of the specific status of the liberty or the specific level of scrutiny, it 
is unclear who might invoke a right to posthumous conception if it were protected by 
the Due Process Clauses. There are least two possible scenarios. First, a decedent’s 
representative might argue that the decedent retains a constitutional liberty right to 
decide whether his or her gametes should be used for posthumous conception.51 
Second, a surviving spouse, partner, parent, or other interested individual might 
argue that they have a constitutional liberty right to use the decedent’s gametes to 
engage in posthumous conception. 
With respect to the first scenario, a decedent most likely does not have a 
constitutional liberty right to decide whether his or her gametes will be used for 
posthumous conception.52 While some might argue otherwise53—reasoning, in part, 
                                                 
 49 Id. at 720–21. If the liberty was “fundamental,” laws that burdened it received strict 
scrutiny; if not, they received rational basis review. 
 50 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 571–72 (analyzing Texas’s same-sex sodomy ban and stating the 
following: “[W]e think that our laws and traditions in the past half century are of most 
relevance here. [They] show an emerging awareness that liberty gives substantial protection to 
adult persons in deciding how to conduct their private lives in matters pertaining to sex. 
‘[H]istory and tradition are the starting point but not in all cases the ending point of the 
substantive due process inquiry.’”) (internal citations omitted). The description of the level of 
scrutiny as “a more searching form of rational basis review” derives in part from Justice 
O’Connor’s concurrence in Lawrence. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 580 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
While Justice O’Connor was writing about the Equal Protection rather than Due Process 
Clause, one could argue that the majority’s due-process-based decision applied a similarly 
heightened form of rational basis review. 
 51 While some have explored the debate over what should occur when the decedent was 
silent with respect to his or her wishes, this essay sets that scenario aside and focuses on cases 
in which the decedent clearly expressed his or her wishes. This is most common in situations 
where the decedent cryopreserved his or her genetic material during his or her lifetime and 
was directly asked to contemplate the possibility of posthumous conception. 
 52 See John Robertson, Posthumous Reproduction, 69 IND. L.J. 1027, 1041–42 (1994) 
(“Even if the Court found that noncoital reproduction was protected [as a fundamental 
constitutional right], decisions about posthumous reproduction are so far removed from [the] 
interests [motivating non-posthumous reproduction] that it is highly unlikely that a 
fundamental constitutional right would be found.”). 
 53 Professor Anne Reichman Schiff, for example, has written, “the right to avoid becoming 
a biological parent should generally be respected after death as it is in life, and . . . infringing 
upon this interest constitutes a serious violation of an individual’s procreative liberty.” Anne 
Reichman Schiff, Arising from the Dead: Challenges of Posthumous Procreation, 75 N.C. L. 
REV. 901, 908 (1997). Professor Kathryn Katz has similarly written, “The dead are not usually 
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that one’s liberty to make decisions about procreation should endure so long as his or 
her genetic material remains viable—such arguments ignore the close connection 
between procreative rights and parental rights.54 The liberty to make procreative 
decisions is closely tied to the liberty to make parenting decisions, and the dead can 
neither enjoy the rights nor carry out the responsibilities of parenthood. As Professor 
John Robertson wrote in his seminal article titled Posthumous Reproduction, “The 
interest in controlling reproductive events that will not occur until after one is dead is 
simply too attenuated a version of the important interests that one has in controlling 
reproduction while alive to warrant constitutional protection.”55 The decedent, 
therefore, most likely does not have a constitutional liberty right to make decisions 
about posthumous conception.56 
It should, as an aside, be noted that the decedent may potentially assert a property 
right created by state law that would afford him or her some control over the 
disposition of his or her gametes. Decedents are generally able to exercise control 
over the disposition of their organs and tissue57 and, while gametes may be viewed as 
quite different from organs and tissue,58 decedents have in some cases been allowed 
to transfer vials of sperm by will.59 Further discussion of the decedent’s potential 
property right is beyond the scope of this essay. 
With respect to the second scenario, a surviving spouse, partner, parent, or other 
interested individual might argue that they have a constitutional liberty right to use 
the decedent’s gametes to engage in posthumous conception.60 Although living 
persons clearly have procreative liberty, that liberty does not encompass the use of 
another person’s gametes.61 As Professor Katheryn Katz observed in her 2006 article 
titled Parenthood from the Grave, the right “to procreate with a partner of one’s 
                                                                                                                   
thought of as having rights that survive death, but . . . procreative rights are exceptional.”  
Katz, supra note 9. 
 54 The Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments protect not only 
procreative rights but also parental rights. See, e.g., Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); 
Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925), Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000). 
 55 Robertson, supra note 52, at 1042. Professor Robertson continues, “This is true both for 
engaging in posthumous reproduction and for avoiding posthumous reproduction.” Robertson, 
supra note 52, at 1042. 
 56 It should be noted that states may give deference to decedent’s wishes, and that this 
article is only addressing the issue of whether the decedent has a constitutional liberty right. 
 57 See, e.g., UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT § 8 (amended 2008) (providing that, if the 
decedent’s wishes with respect to organ and tissue donation are known they should be 
honored, even if the next-of-kin disagrees). 
 58 Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992) (holding that frozen embryos were 
different from other human tissue because of their potential to become persons). 
 59 Hecht v. Superior Court, 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 275 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that Kane 
had a property interest in, and could therefore bequeath, his stored sperm to his partner, 
Hecht). 
 60 The parties are listed in order of the probability with which their requests will be 
granted, all things being equal. 
 61 Ethics Comm. of the Am. Soc’y for Reprod. Med., Posthumous Reprod., 82 FERTILITY 
& STERILITY S260, S261 (2004). 
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choice . . . is limited by the requirement that the partner must consent.”62 She thus 
reached the conclusion that survivors do not have a constitutional liberty right to 
make unilateral decisions about posthumous conception.63 Indeed, as evidenced by 
divorce-related disputes, even where two parties consented to the use of their 
gametes to create embryos, it is not at all clear that one of them could later make a 
unilateral decision to use those embryos.64 
It should, again as merely an aside, be noted that the survivor may potentially 
assert a property right created by state law that would afford him or her some control 
over the decedent’s gametes. States, for example, grant survivors who are next-of-
kin the right to possess the decedent’s body for purposes of burial, donation, and the 
prevention of mutilation.65 It is unlikely, however, that this would translate into a 
right to order an invasive procedure such as posthumous gamete retrieval, or to 
utilize previously frozen gametes without the decedent’s express consent. The 
decedent might, however, pass previously frozen gametes to a survivor by will and 
convey his or her consent to their use for conception.66 Further discussion of the 
survivor’s potential property rights is beyond the scope of this essay. 
Moving from the doctrinal to the practical, the technology enabling posthumous 
conception has indisputably and irrevocably expanded individual liberty. Whether or 
not there is any constitutional liberty right under existing due process doctrine, the 
paucity of legal regulation surrounding reproductive technologies has conferred 
substantial practical liberty on surviving spouses (and, in some cases, other 
individuals) who wish to engage in posthumous conception—especially where the 
decedent has clearly expressed his or her consent. Guidelines issued by the Ethics 
Committee of the American Society for Reproductive Medicine provide that if the 
decedent has consented to posthumous reproduction it is generally permissible for 
doctors to enable posthumous conception.67 
                                                 
 62 Katz, supra note 9, at 313. 
 63 Katz, supra note 9, at 313. 
 64 Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 588 (preventing an ex-wife from donating embryos against an ex-
husband’s wishes, but observing that “[t]he case would be closer if [the ex-wife] were seeking 
to use the preembryos herself, but only if she could not achieve parenthood by any other 
reasonable means”). For further discussion of these issues, see Kass v. Kass, 91 N.Y.2d 554 
(1998) and A.Z. v. B.Z., 725 N.E.2d 1051 (Mass. 2000). 
 65 See Brotherton v. Cleveland, 923F.2d 477 (6th Cir. 1991). 
 66 Hecht v. Sup. Ct., 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 275 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993). 
 67 Ethics Comm. of the Am. Soc’y for Reprod. Med., supra note 61, at S260–61. The 
Ethics Committee stated:  
If an individual designates the use of stored frozen gametes or embryos that can be 
used for posthumous pregnancy, either for the use of a spouse or as a donation to 
others, it would seem to be totally appropriate to honor this designation after their 
death in the absence of any adverse consequences to the living participants in the 
pregnancy or any expected children. The gestating woman and the rearing parent(s) 
must be fully informed and in agreement with the process. 
 Ethics Comm. of the Am. Soc’y for Reprod. Med., supra note 61, at S261. If, however, the 
decedent was silent or wished not to procreate posthumously, the ASRM prohibits doctors 
from proceeding. The Ethics Committee stated:  
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B.  Equality Rights of Posthumously Conceived Children 
Equality, like liberty, has both doctrinal and practical definitions, and this section 
begins by focusing on its doctrinal definitions. To that end, it offers a brief overview 
of cases involving discrimination against non-martial children and follows other 
scholarship in arguing that the same principles applying in those cases ought to 
apply in cases involving discrimination against posthumously conceived children.68 
Turning to equality’s more practical definitions, this section concludes by observing 
that when the legal system pronounces a posthumously conceived child a single-
parent child it imposes dignitary harms and interferes with decisions that should be 
reserved for the child and his or her family. The legal system, in sum, renders the 
posthumously conceived child unequal. 
The Equal Protection Clause, which prevents the government from “deny[ing] to 
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws,” has been 
interpreted as protecting children from discrimination based on the marital status of 
their parents.69 Laws targeting non-marital children have historically received a form 
of intermediate scrutiny70 and have been invalidated unless they were substantially 
related to legitimate governmental interests.71 Such laws have raised suspicion 
among the justices for a variety of reasons.72 First, non-marital status is never 
volitional, since “no child is responsible for his birth and penalizing the illegitimate 
child is ineffectual—as well as an unjust—way of deterring the parent.”73 Second, 
non-marital status “bears no relation to the individual’s ability to participate in and 
contribute to society.”74 And third, non-martial children have endured a long history 
                                                                                                                   
Programs are urged to insist that donors make their wishes known. If no decision on 
disposition after death has been made, one would expect that in most instances this 
would preclude any posthumous use. A request by a husband or wife for use of stored 
gametes or embryos to override a prior denial of posthumous reproduction by the 
deceased spouse should not be honored. 
Ethics Comm. of the Am. Soc’y for Reprod. Med., supra note 61, at S261. 
 68 See Julie E. Goodwin, Not All Children Are Created Equal: A Proposal to Address 
Equal Protection Inheritance Rights of Posthumously Conceived Children, 4 CONN. PUB. INT. 
L.J. 234, 235 (2005) (“assert[ing] that state classifications that restrict the rights of 
posthumously conceived children to inherit must satisfy intermediate scrutiny”). 
 69 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 70 Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 505–06 (1976). Although Mathews does not expressly 
apply intermediate scrutiny, later cases reference it as having applied intermediate scrutiny. 
Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988) (citing Mathews after stating that discriminatory 
classifications based on illegitimacy receive intermediate scrutiny). 
 71 City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 441 (1985) (“[O]fficial 
discriminations resting on [illegitimacy] are . . . subject to somewhat heightened review [and] 
‘will survive equal protection scrutiny to the extent they are substantially related to a 
legitimate state interest.’”) (citing Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91, 99 (1982)). 
 72 A concise and very useful overview of the law as it relates to non-martial children is 
available in ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 933–34 (3d. ed. 2009). 
 73 Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972). 
 74 Mathews, 427 U.S. at 505. 
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of discrimination that continues, albeit in less harsh forms, to the present.75 Their 
long history of discrimination is evident from the fact that they were, at common 
law, “filius nullius, or children of no one” and thus unable to inherit from either 
parent through intestate succession.76 Continued discrimination is evident from the 
fact that non-marital children must still take special steps to be able to inherit from 
their fathers through intestate succession.77 
Although these attributes of non-marital children have raised suspicion about 
laws that target marital status, the Court has not been willing to apply strict scrutiny 
to such laws—in part, because marital status is invisible and being a non-marital 
child “does not carry an obvious badge.”78 In applying intermediate scrutiny, the 
Court has been relatively consistent in invalidating laws that disadvantage all non-
martial children, but has varied in its view of laws that disadvantage only some 
subset of non-martial children.79 This variance is illustrated by two cases decided in 
the 1970s, both of which relate to the Social Security Act. 
Jiminez v. Weinberger, decided in 1974, involved a claim by non-marital 
children for disability benefits under the Social Security Act.80 Jiminez had three 
children and, while the oldest was approved for benefits based on the fact that she 
had been dependent on Jiminez prior to the onset of his disability, the younger two 
were denied benefits because they had not been born until after the onset of his 
disability.81 Even though all three children had lived with and been supported by 
Jiminez their entire lives, only one was eligible for benefits as a dependent.82 
Although other children born after the onset of a parent’s disability—i.e., all marital 
children and those non-marital children who could inherit under state law, had been 
legitimated under state law, or were “illegitimate only because of some formal defect 
in their parents’ ceremonial marriage”83—were presumed dependent, Jiminez’s 
                                                 
 75 Weber, 406 U.S. at 175(“The status of illegitimacy has expressed through the ages 
society’s condemnation of irresponsible liaisons beyond the bonds of marriage.”). 
 76 Goodwin, supra note 68, at 241. By the 1700s, non-marital children were able to inherit 
through intestate succession from their mothers, but it was not until recently (and with proof 
of paternity) that they were able to inherit through intestate succession from their fathers. 
Goodwin, supra note 68, at 241. 
 77 Lewis, supra note 10, at 36 (“Marital children only have to be born to have the right to 
inherit. Whereas, in most states, non-marital children have to jump through legal hoops in 
order to gain the right to inherit from their fathers.”); Richard F. Storrow, The Phantom 
Children of the Republic: International Surrogacy and the New Illegitimacy, 20 AM. U. J. 
GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 561, 577 (2012) (“Most states have passed laws allowing nonmarital 
children to inherit from their mothers, but, by and large, nonmarital children still face legal 
obstacles to inheriting from their fathers.”). 
 78 Mathews, 427 U.S. at 506. 
 79 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 72, at 934. 
 80 Jiminez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628 (1974). 
 81 Id. at 630–31.  
 82 Id.  
 83 Id. at 634–36. The full list of non-marital children who could receive benefits was as 
follows: those “(a) who can inherit under state intestacy laws, or (b) who are legitimated under 
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younger two children were denied not only the presumption of dependency but also 
the opportunity to prove actual dependency.84 The Court, in holding the 
discrimination between two subsets of non-marital children unconstitutional, 
observed that the Act was both over-inclusive (in allowing some non-marital 
children to receive benefits based on an incorrect presumption of dependency) and 
under-inclusive (in preventing other non-marital children from receiving benefits 
despite their actual dependency).85 Ultimately, the Court promoted the primary 
purpose of the provision at issue, which was “to provide support for dependents of a 
disabled wage earner.”86 
Mathews v. Lucas involved a claim for Social Security survivors benefits by the 
non-marital children of a deceased insured wage earner.87 Under the Social Security 
Act, all marital children and some non-marital children—those who were presumed 
dependent based on, for example, their ability to inherit under state intestacy law and 
those who could prove actual dependency at the time of death—were entitled to 
benefits, while others were not.88 Robert Cuffee’s two children were neither 
presumptively nor actually dependent on him at the time of his death, and were thus 
denied benefits.89 They challenged the denial, but the Court rejected their challenge 
because the provision at issue was meant to provide for dependents and the 
presumptions of dependency were “reasonably related to the likelihood of 
dependency.”90 Although some children who were similarly situated—in that they 
were not actually dependent on their parent at the time of his death—would receive 
benefits based on their presumptive dependency while the Cuffee children would 
not, the Court found no equal protection violation.91 
                                                                                                                   
state law, or (c) who are illegitimate only because of some formal defect in their parents' 
ceremonial marriage.” Id. at 635–36. 
 84 Id. at 634–35. 
 85 Id. at 637. 
 86 Id. at 634. 
 87 Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 495 (1976). 
 88 Id. at 498–99, 502. While the law is slightly more complicated than the textual sentence 
suggests, the additional nuances do not provide much more clarity. The Court wrote, in full,  
Unless the child has been adopted by some other individual, a child who is legitimate, 
or a child who would be entitled to inherit personal property from the insured parent's 
estate under the applicable state intestacy law, is considered to have been dependent at 
the time of the parent's death. Even lacking this relationship under state law, a child, 
unless adopted by some other individual, is entitled to a presumption of dependency if 
the decedent, before death, (a) had gone through a marriage ceremony with the other 
parent, resulting in a purported marriage between them which, but for a nonobvious 
legal defect, would have been valid, or (b) in writing had acknowledged the child to 
be his, or (c) had been decreed by a court to be the child's father, or (d) had been 
ordered by a court to support the child because the child was his.  
Id.  
 89 Id. at 500–01. 
 90 Id. at 509. 
 91 Id. at 495–523. 
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Others, including Julie Goodwin (whose work this section draws upon), have 
considered how the above doctrine might apply to posthumously conceived children. 
One must begin the discussion by observing that posthumously conceived children 
are, in fact, a subset of non-marital children.92 As the Supreme Judicial Court of 
Massachusetts explained, “[b]ecause death ends a marriage, posthumously conceived 
children are always non-marital children.”93 Conception status (i.e., posthumous or 
non-posthumous) also shares several of the features of marital status.94 First, like 
marital status, it is never volitional, since “no child is responsible for his birth.”95 
Second, like marital status, it “bears no relation to the individual’s ability to 
participate in and contribute to society.”96 And third, while non-marital children may 
have endured a longer history of discrimination than posthumously conceived 
children this is at least in part because posthumous conception was not 
technologically possible for most of our nation’s history.97 Furthermore, it is clear 
that posthumously conceived children have experienced and continue to experience 
discrimination, both social and legal.98 In some states—such as Florida, where the 
Capato case occurred—posthumously conceived children are, as previously 
discussed, barred from taking through intestate succession.99 
The Capato Court, however, neither viewed posthumously conceived children as 
a subset of non-marital children nor recognized them as similar to non-marital 
children and thus applied only rational basis review.100 While acknowledging that 
classifications disadvantaging non-marital children are quasi-suspect, in part because 
of the unfairness of punishing children for the acts of their parents,101 the Capato 
Court held that “posthumously conceived children [have not been shown to] share 
the characteristics that prompted our skepticism of classifications disadvantaging 
                                                 
 92 Goodwin, supra note 68 (citing Woodward v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 760 N.E.2d at 266–
67 (Mass. 2002)). 
 93 Woodward v. Comm’r of  Soc. Sec., 760 N.E.2d 257, 266–67 (Mass. 2002)(“Because 
death ends a marriage, see Callow v. Thomas, 322 Mass. 550, 55 78 N.E.2d 637 (1948); 
Rawson v. Rawson, 156 Mass. 578, 580 31 N.E. 653 (1892), posthumously conceived children 
are always nonmarital children.”). 
 94 See also Goodwin, supra note 68. 
 95 Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972). 
 96 Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 505 (1976).  
 97 Goodwin, supra note 68, at 241. 
 98 Goodwin, supra note 68, at 272–73. 
 99 FLA. STAT. § 742.17(4) (2013); see Goodwin, supra note 69, at 241. While 
posthumously conceived children may be unable to inherit through intestate succession, most 
states allow children born either before or within 300 days of a parent’s death to inherit 
through instate succession. Goodwin, supra note 69, at 241. 
 100 Astrue v. Capato, 132 S. Ct. 2021, 2033 (2012). It should be noted that the court did not 
definitively decide whether heightened scrutiny would be appropriate if, in a future case, 
posthumously conceived children were shown to share the characteristics that render non-
marital children a quasi-suspect class. Id. 
 101 Id. (citing Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988)). 
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[non-marital] children.”102 This suggests that, at least for the moment, laws targeting 
posthumously conceived children are likely to receive only rational basis review. 
Even if the Court had applied heightened scrutiny in Capato, however, the provision 
at issue might have survived, since the Court viewed its purpose as providing 
“dependent members of [a wage earner’s] family with protection against . . . [the] 
loss of [the insured’s] earnings.”103 Although some posthumously conceived 
children—e.g., those entitled to inherit under state intestacy law—would receive 
benefits, no posthumously conceived child would be able to illustrate loss in the 
sense of dependency at the time of their parent’s death. 
Turning to equality’s more practical definitions, limiting the law’s reliance on 
parent-child relationships as a proxy for provider-dependent relationships could 
mitigate the inequality experienced by posthumously conceived children. When the 
legal system pronounces a posthumously conceived child a single-parent child it 
imposes dignitary harms and interferes with decisions that should be reserved for 
private actors. Rather than determining whether a deceased gamete-provider is a 
parent, the law ought to leave that decision to the child and his or her family. The 
term parent carries substantial symbolic weight and should not be legally imposed or 
withheld in this context. Instead, the law should focus on the concrete incidents of 
parentage, such as being a financial provider. 
IV.  DIMINISHING THE LAW’S FOCUS ON PARENTAGE 
Part IV argues that the inequality experienced by posthumously conceived 
children could be at least partly mitigated by shifting the law’s focus away from 
parent-child relationships and toward provider-dependent relationships. It 
specifically argues that we ought to eliminate the use of parentage as a proxy for 
dependency and, in turn, as a path to survivors benefits. This would, in cases like 
Capato, allow legal entities to identify provider-dependent relationships and allocate 
benefits without making any pronouncements about parent-child relationships. Part 
IV(A) discusses how we might eliminate the use of parent-child relationships from 
the Social Security Act, and Part IV(B) discusses how we might then allocate 
benefits. 
A.  From Parents and Children to Providers and Dependents 
 Parent-child relationships are often used as proxies for provider-dependent 
relationships and, thus, as one path to governmental benefits.104 Under the Social 
Security Act, children are generally viewed as the dependents of their legal 
parents.105 Section 402(3)(A) provides, “A child shall be deemed dependent upon his 
father [or mother] unless, at [the time of death, the father or mother] was not living 
with or contributing to the support of [the] child and [the] child is [not the father’s or 
mother’s] legitimate child.”106 While the cases discussed above speak to some of the 
                                                 
 102 Id.  
 103 Id. at 2032. The Court went on to discuss the Ninth Circuit’s holding that the “regime is 
‘reasonably related to the government's twin interests in [reserving] benefits [for] those 
children who have lost a parent's support.’” Id. at 2033. 
 104 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 402(d)(3)(A) (2013). 
 105 Id. 
 106 Id. 
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intricacies of the Social Security Act’s provisions, it suffices for purposes of this Part 
to say that being the “child” of a deceased insured wage earner is in many cases the 
key to being deemed a “dependent” and, thus, to receiving benefits.  
 Inasmuch as the Social Security Act is designed to provide benefits for the 
dependents of deceased insured wage earners,107 there is no reason other than 
administrative convenience to use parent-child relationships as a proxy for provider-
dependent relationships. And, it should be emphasized, the administrative 
convenience of allowing parental status to determine provider status is outweighed 
by the very real costs it imposes on children. It results, for example, in some 
posthumously conceived children who have only one provider unnecessarily being 
told they also have only one parent.108 
While “parent” may at first blush seem to be a useful category, little effort is 
required to illustrate that it is a highly unstable category—even outside the unique 
context of posthumous conception.109 There are, as Professor Susan Appleton 
observes in her article titled Parents by the Numbers, many kinds of parents110—one 
might, for example, identify birth parents, genetic parents, intended parents, adoptive 
parents, de facto parents, and psychological parents.111 And, there are at least three 
common ways of defining what it means to be a legal “parent.” One might focus on 
genetics, on intent, or on actual parental conduct.112 
 As applied to posthumous conception, a deceased gamete-provider’s 
parental status varies depending on whether one focuses on genetics, intent, or 
parental conduct. If one focuses on genetics, the deceased gamete-provider is always 
a parent; if one focuses on intent, he may in some cases be a parent; and, if one 
focuses on parental conduct, he will never be a parent. With respect to parental 
conduct, as Part III(A) discussed, deceased individuals can neither enjoy the rights 
nor carry out the responsibilities of parenthood. As Professor Robertson (whose 
                                                 
 107 Capato, 132 S.Ct. at 2032, (citing Califano v. Jobst, 434 U.S. 47, 52 (1977)); see also 
42 U.S.C. § 402(1)(C) (2013) (providing that every “child” who is “dependent” upon a 
deceased insured wage earner is entitled to benefits). This is not the only purpose of the Act; 
the Act provides others with benefits as well. 42 U.S.C. § 402(1)(C) (2013). 
 108 It should be noted that, although it is not the focus of this essay, allowing parental status 
to determine provider status may also result in some children who had two providers being 
denied benefits on the grounds that only one of those providers was a parent. 
 109 There is a vast body of scholarship on the law of parentage. Important recent 
contributions include Susan Frelich Appleton, supra note 7, at 25–26; Julie Shapiro, Counting 
from One: Replacing the Marital Presumption with a Presumption of Sole Parentage, 20 AM. 
U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 509 (2012); Katharine K. Baker, Bionormativity and the 
Construction of Parenthood, 42 GA. L. REV. 649, 655 (2008); Melanie B. Jacobs, My Two 
Dads: Disaggregating Biological and Social Paternity, 38 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 809, 851–52 (2006); 
Laura T. Kessler, Community Parenting, 24 WASH. U. J.L. & Pol'y 47, 49 (2007). 
 110 Appleton, supra note 7, at 25–26. 
 111 Appleton, supra note 7, at 25–26.  
 112 Deborah H. Wald, The Parentage Puzzle: The Interplay Between Genetics, Procreative 
Intent, and Parental Conduct in Determining Legal Parentage, 15 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. 
POL’Y & L. 379, 381 (2007) (“As our courts and legislatures grapple with [determining 
parentage], the primary factors they have considered are procreative intent, genetics, the 
marital presumption, and parental conduct.”). 
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work on this topic is discussed in Part III(A)) explained, “[o]rdinarily, reproduction 
is valued because of the genetic, gestational, and rearing experiences involved.”113 
Yet, individuals whose gametes are used posthumously “will not gestate [or] rear [, 
and a]t most, [will experience only] the present satisfaction of knowing that genetic 
reproduction might occur after [they have] died.”114 Conversely, they will “not 
experience anxiety about the welfare of their offspring or the fear that a person will 
knock on their door claiming to be their child.”115 He concludes, “[a]t most, they will 
have the certainty that no children will be born after they die and they are no longer 
around to see, rear, or worry about them.”116 
Many scholars have recognized the difficulty in relying exclusively on genetics, 
intent, or parental conduct to determine parenthood,117 and one way of alleviating the 
difficulty is to avoid it altogether by eliminating the determination of parenthood 
wherever possible. The law could alternatively focus on identifying the individuals 
who fill the specific roles traditionally associated with parenthood, such as the role 
of financial provider. Professor Appleton has, for example, explored the idea of 
“decoupl[ing] parental status from [the associated] financial obligations,”118 and has 
argued that the bundle of rights and responsibilities that has historically flowed from 
parenthood has, in some ways, already been unbound.119 Eliminating the focus on 
parental status in favor of a focus on provider status would reserve the decision of 
whether to view a deceased gamete provider as a parent for the posthumously 
conceived child and his or her family. This would not only prevent the government 
from unnecessary intervention, but also protect the child from the confusion that 
could result if the family reached a different conclusion than the government. 
On a practical level, one could easily determine whether a deceased gamete 
provider should be viewed as a financial provider who was capable of transmitting 
survivors benefits without determining whether he or she was the child’s parent. One 
could conclude that deceased gamete providers are never financial providers, since 
even if they pass property to their posthumously conceived children they cannot 
make subsequent financial provisions. Or, one could conclude that deceased gamete 
providers may be financial providers in a narrow set of circumstances—for example, 
where they have passed property by will to their posthumously conceived children. 
While there may be other alternatives, the key point is that it is possible to sever the 
determination of parental status from the determination of provider status with the 
goal of reserving the former for the posthumously conceived child and his or her 
family. 
                                                 
 113 Robertson, supra note 52, at 1031.  
 114 Robertson, supra note 52, at 1031–32. 
 115 Robertson, supra note 52, at 1032. 
 116 Robertson, supra note 52, at 1032. 
 117 Pamela Laufer-Ukeles, Mothering for Money: Regulating Commercial Intimacy, 88 
IND. L.J. 1223, 1258 (2013) (“[I]ntent, genetics, gestation, and functional care all matter in 
determining parental ties, and it is difficult and perhaps artificial to separate one out as the 
exclusive indicator of legal parenthood.”). 
 118 Appleton, supra note 7, at 38.  
 119 Appleton, supra note 7, at 22–23, 26. 
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Inquiries into provider status rather than parental status are, thus, both possible 
and preferable. It should be noted that, as will be discussed in Part IV(B), such 
inquiries could also, if applied uniformly, result in some children receiving benefits 
through individuals to whom they have no legal relationship under the current 
system. Such a system could more accurately reflect the reality of children’s lives 
and more justly effectuate the purpose of the Social Security Act, which is to provide 
for the dependents of deceased insured wage earners.120 
While proposing to diminish the use of parentage may seem radical, it is not 
entirely novel. Several scholars have recently questioned the law’s focus on 
parentage. Professor Melissa Murray has explored the possibility of “dismantling 
parenthood altogether as a legal category.”121 While she urges caution—in part, 
because the concept of the legal parent is so pervasive122—her work illustrates that 
the law’s assumptions about legal parents are often not well aligned with the realities 
of parenting. The law, for example, assumes that parents are their children’s primary 
caregivers, while in reality “parents routinely rely on [others] to help them discharge 
their caregiving responsibilities.”123 Professor Susan Appleton has relatedly 
challenged “parenthood’s supposed indivisibility” and argued that “family law 
already routinely practices disaggregation of parental rights and responsibilities.”124 
States, as Professor Appleton points out, already have elaborate rules for dividing the 
incidents of parentage upon divorce.125 Courts regularly dictate who will receive 
physical custody, who will receive legal custody, and who will provide financial 
support.126 Allowing legal entities to make more nuanced determinations provides a 
host of benefits, from promoting the just allocation of benefits to allowing families 
to make their own decisions about who will take on the mantle of parenthood. 
B.  Allocating Benefits in a Less Parent-Focused Regime 
If, as Part IV(A) urges, we shifted our focus away from parent-child relationships 
to vitiate the status inequality that posthumously conceived children experience, the 
question of which children should receive survivors benefits would remain. Karen 
Capato said in an interview that her case was “not about the money,”127 but one can 
assume that money was at least a relevant consideration—or that it would be for 
other litigants. There are multiple options for going forward under a less parent-
focused regime, and this section will sketch the outlines of one possibility. 
                                                 
 120 Astrue v. Capato, 132 S. Ct. 2021, 2028 (2012) (citing Califano v. Jobst, 434 U.S. 47, 
52 (1977)); see also 42 U.S.C. § 402(1)(C)(ii) (2013); Webber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 
U.S. 164 (1972). 
 121 Melissa Murray, The Networked Family: Reframing the Legal Understanding of 
Caregiving and Caregivers, 94 VA. L. REV. 385, 390, 453 (2008). 
 122 Id. at 453. 
 123 Id. at 390. 
 124 Appleton, supra note 7, at 26.   
 125 Appleton, supra note 7, at 11–69. 
 126 Appleton, supra note 7, at 41. 
 127 See Chelsea Henderson, Dads’ Donations Leave Final Gifts: Posthumously-Conceived 
Children Face Legal Barriers, UNIV. PRESS, Apr. 27, 2012, http://www.lamaruniversitypress.c
om/dads-donations-leave-final-gifts-1.2860028#.UdcZQqwkzfU. 
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If the goal were to maintain the existing system largely intact, one could simply 
allocate survivors benefits to those children who had actually received support from 
a deceased insured wage earner during his or her lifetime. Such a system would not, 
of course, have changed the result for Karen Capato’s twins. They did not receive 
support from Robert Capato during his lifetime and they would not receive benefits 
under this new system. Furthermore, such a system would change the results 
unfavorably for some posthumously conceived children. Those who live in states 
with intestacy laws allowing them to inherit from their deceased genetic parents 
would receive benefits under the existing system, but would not receive benefits 
under this new system. 
There would be, however, three important benefits to this new system. First, it 
would treat all posthumously conceived children equally—despite the fact that 
equality would take the form of a blanket denial of survivors benefits. Second, it 
would treat posthumously conceived children and non-posthumously conceived 
children equally, because it would hold them all to the same standard. Under the new 
standard, it should be noted that benefits would be awarded to some previously 
ineligible children—i.e., those who had been receiving support from a non-parent.128 
Third and finally, this new system would prevent the government from making 
unnecessary pronouncements about parentage. Rather than dictating whether a given 
deceased insured wage earner was a parent, administrators would simply determine 
whether he or she had been a provider. While identifying actual providers rather than 
using parentage as a proxy would of course impose new burdens (on, for example, 
administrators), such burdens would be far outweighed by the benefits that would be 
conferred on society as a whole. While there are other more radical alternatives—
such as, for example, dismantling survivors benefits in favor of a program that 
would benefit all children by decoupling child support entirely from previous 
provider support—they are beyond the scope of this essay. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Part V concludes that, if we focused less on parental status and more on provider 
status we could protect the liberty of adults, promote the equality of children, and 
perhaps achieve a more just distribution of governmental benefits. Removing the 
requirement of a parent-child relationship from the Social Security Act would have 
positive consequences for both adult’s procreative liberty and children’s equality. It 
would protect adult’s procreative liberty in the sense that prospective parents would 
not have to worry that electing posthumous conception would adversely affect their 
children. It would promote children’s equality by removing any harm that might 
flow from the disconnect between their mother’s view of their parentage and the 
law’s view of their parentage. It would, furthermore, be consistent with recent 
proposals to rethink the law’s focus on parentage. 
As previously mentioned, Karen Capato said in an interview that her case was 
“not about the money.”129 Part of what it was likely about, however, was whether her 
                                                 
 128 These children would have been denied benefits under the old system because they were 
not “children” of a deceased insured wage earner, but they would be awarded benefits under 
this new system. Astrue v. Capato, 132 S. Ct. 2021, 2028 (2012). The Capato Court noted that 
the Act’s purpose was to reserve benefits for “those children who have lost a parent’s 
support.”  Id. This proposal would give benefits to any children who had lost a provider’s 
support. Id. 
 129 See Henderson, supra note 127.  
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deceased husband was the legal parent of her children. This essay would reform the 
law such that survivors benefits could be allocated without any determination of 
legal parentage. This would give prospective parents in Karen Capato’s situation the 
liberty to make decisions about posthumous conception without fear of imposing 
legal inequality on their children. It would also enable the resulting children and 
their families to make their own decisions about whether to view the deceased 
gamete provider as a parent. Understood more broadly, this idea of unbinding the 
term “parent” from the historically associated rights and responsibilities could 
promote liberty as well as equality and ultimately enable courts to make more 
nuanced determinations about the rights and responsibilities associated with 
childrearing. 
 
 
